A sequential procurement model for a PPP project pipeline by De Clerck, Dennis & Demeulemeester, Erik
  
 
 
A sequential procurement 
model for a PPP project 
pipeline 
De Clerck D, Demeulemeester E. 
KBI_1501 
      
 
 
 
      
 
 
1 
 
A sequential procurement model for a PPP project pipeline 
Dennis De Clerck
1
, Erik Demeulemeester 
KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business 
Department of Decision Sciences and Information Management 
Naamsestraat 69, B-3000 Leuven, Belgium 
Tel: +32-16-32.67.58 / +32-16-32.69.72 
Fax: +32-16-32.66.24 
dennis.declerck@kuleuven.be 
erik.demeulemeester@kuleuven.be 
 
Abstract 
Public-private partnerships have seen the daylight in response to the adagio that project 
responsibilities and risks should be efficiently allocated between the public and the private 
sector. Nevertheless, the considerable bidding costs inhibit the competition in the market. A 
trustworthy project agenda could substantiate the PPP market’s attractiveness in the belief that a 
current success results in a knowledge and cost advantage in future tenders. This paper builds a 
sequential PPP procurement model and heuristically approximates the Markov perfect 
equilibrium in which contractors determine how much money they are willing to invest in the bid 
preparation and which mark-up is appropriate for each project in the pipeline. A pipeline of 
projects pushes down the mark-ups and the government procurement cost. Nonetheless, 
according to the experiments, it are only players with an initial experiential advantage who tend 
to make higher investment efforts so that additional governmental policies might be required to 
level the playing field.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper offers a theoretical approach in analyzing public-private partnership (PPP) 
procurement for a sequence of projects. Since risk assessment and mitigation strategies continue 
to receive a great emphasis within the project management field, a PPP is a recent phenomenon 
that aims to attain an efficient risk allocation between a public sector entity and a private 
consortium. The latter party may, in addition to the construction, also engage in the design, 
maintenance and/or operation of the project. Due to the complex project nature and the high 
societal value that is at stake, financial performance requirements and high quality standards are 
important challenges one needs to face. Therefore, contractors ought to prepare a qualitative bid 
proposal to submit to the contracting government. The preparation of this proposal is costly (e.g., 
consultancy cost, working cost, design cost) and the risk of not being awarded the contract is 
empirically claimed to be a burden for contractors [1, 7, 25]. In order to ensure the competition, 
policy makers are endowed to seek for feasible ways to substantiate the PPP market’s 
attractiveness. This paper investigates whether a project pipeline succeeds in positively affecting 
the contractors’ bidding behavior. If the government agrees on a clear project agenda, contractors 
might be more eager to enter a particular market. Winning a contract might result in a 
competitive advantage in future tenders and, moreover, past losses can be recovered in future 
tenders.  
This paper converts the PPP procurement setting into a sequential procurement auction format 
in which the government acts as the decision maker. For each project in the pipeline, the 
contractors or consortia that are invited for the tender determine their appropriate bid preparation 
effort willingness (i.e., the investment decision) and the mark-up percentage (i.e., the mark-up 
decision). Within this competitive framework, the bidders are heterogeneous in their experience 
levels, because winning a contract increases the experience in future tenders. The past experience 
a bidder has obtained together with the pre-tender investment efforts could lead to an increased 
ability to estimate the project cost on the one hand and to efficiency gains that result in a lower 
expected cost on the other hand. The study analytically characterizes the equilibrium of this 
stochastic game and employs an experimental setting to approximate the Markov perfect 
equilibrium for different project cost features and a varying number of projects in the pipeline. 
The method applies a best response heuristic for which an algorithmic approximation that is 
based on both an electromagnetism-like mechanism as well as a local search procedure 
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efficiently detects the best response. This approach succeeds in looking at the entire, continuous 
action search space in order to identify candidate equilibria. 
This research benefits practitioners and policy makers by offering a theoretical foundation for 
PPP procurement modeling. Next to its practical relevance, this work contributes to different 
stretches in the academic literature. First of all, competitive procurement models are scarce in the 
PPP literature while they could gain insights into a field in which empirical bidding data are 
often inadequately available. Moreover, theoretical models allow for an initial feasibility 
assessment of policy measures. Secondly, the PPP framework offers research opportunities 
within the OR community. The complex bidding framework is related to the traditional 
procurement auction field. In this vein, the paper’s model can be considered as an auction format 
with asymmetries among the bidders with respect to the project cost distribution and the option 
to invest in information acquisition. The pipeline concept adds a synergetic, sequential feature in 
the sense that past successes lead to a knowledge and cost advantage in future tenders. While the 
model’s complexities hinder a fully analytical approach, the algorithmic game theory assists in 
tackling the inclusiveness of the set-up.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explores the related operations 
research literature. Section 3 delves into the analytical foundation and the Markov equilibrium 
concept and subsequently discusses the experimental implementation and the equilibrium 
approximation algorithm. The outcomes of the scenario analysis are covered in Section 4 and are 
taken forward into a concluding discussion in Section 5.    
2. Literature 
The study of the sequential PPP procurement format is closely linked to the sequential auction 
theory where multiple units are auctioned in a strictly sequential fashion and where the winner is 
considered to be the highest bidder. The views on the expected price trends vary. Weber [48] 
proved that in the case of an uncertain common value, bids follow a Martingale, while the 
majority of theoretical studies argue that bid prices are declining. Examples include Von der 
Fehr [46] who studies auctions with participation cost and Kannan [20] in a setting with 
complete bid revelation. Branco [5] supports the price decline in the case of complementarities 
between identical objects, which is nuanced by Sørensen [41] in the case of a large number of 
stochastically equivalent objects or when probabilities to draw a large value are high. 
Engelbrecht-Wiggans [12] attributes this to the trade-off between a reduced competition effect 
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and a second effect that is related to the number of chances to win. In addition, Menezes and 
Monteiro [27] relate the price trend to the type of synergies of objects. Hence, the sequential 
auction literature can be classified according to this object-related dimension. The objects may 
be complements and create synergies which has been extensively studied by Branco [5], 
Menezes and Monteiro [27] and De Silva et al. [10]. Alternatively, the objects can be 
homogeneous in nature in the sense that they are perfect substitutes [22, 53]. Finally, the objects 
may have the same stochastic feature and are said to be stochastically equivalent [12, 37-38]. 
Our model assumes that the projects have a constant stochastic nature, but contractors’ 
experience in past projects has an influence on the cost probability distribution of future projects. 
Apart from the type of the tendered objects, modeling approaches also differ in their 
consideration of the capacity constraints. Whereas Katzman [22] and Katehakis and Puranam 
[21] for instance do not include a capacity constraint, the contributions of Engelbrecht-Wiggans 
[12], Milgrom and Weber [29], Elmaghraby [11] and Reiβ and Schöndube [37] assume a single-
unit demand. Other studies include monetary constraints [36] or restrict the availability of man-
hours [43]. The PPP model does not account for capacity constraints and the results point 
towards rising mark-ups in later stages of the pipeline. Next to the mark-ups, contractors in the 
PPP model also make a decision on the pre-tender research efforts, but to the best of our 
knowledge, there have been no previous studies on the impact of a sequential mechanism on the 
willingness for information acquisition. The work of for instance Persico [35], Bergemann and 
Välimäki [3] and Shi [40] considers a single-shot game in which the bidders can gain 
information on the value of the auctioned object, but they do not extrapolate to a multi-unit 
environment.  
More particularly, our paper is closely related to the contribution of Takano et al. [43] who 
study the competitive bidding strategy in a sequential setting with inaccurate cost estimates. 
Building upon earlier research from Naert and Weverberg [31] and King and Mercer [24], the 
authors explicitly account for the fact that bids are usually correlated with the estimated cost that 
is subject to inaccuracies. Takano et al. [43] apply a scenario-based approach for the cost 
estimates and a capacity constraint. Our work differs from and extends this study in several 
aspects. First of all, in addition to the mark-up choice, a bidder makes an investment decision 
that reduces the uncertainty and the expected cost. Secondly, Takano et al. [43] simulate costs 
and bids for the competitors, while we look at action equilibria by simultaneously optimizing 
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each bidders’ pay-off. Thirdly, our model does not include capacity constraints or a value at risk 
constraint and deals with a constant number of heterogeneous contractors. Furthermore, it builds 
on the single-shot PPP procurement model of De Clerck and Demeulemeester [9] in three ways. 
Firstly, this paper extends the scope towards a multi-project environment. Besides, the current 
study considers a continuous strategy space and last but not least, the contractors’ pay-offs are 
not derived by a multi-agent simulation approach, but are exactly computed for  presumed 
distributions. 
The methodological approach is based on a dynamic programming model for which Markov 
equilibria are approximated based on a best response heuristic. The Markov perfect equilibrium 
concept, drawn from the study of Maskin and Tirole [26], is a solution concept that solves the 
stochastic game with a finite number of stages and where the pay-off and probabilistic transitions 
depend on the current state and the chosen actions [39]. The solution concept is not uncommon 
within the auction literature. In a sequential auction setting with randomly arriving bidders, Said 
[38] derives Markov equilibria to discuss bid shading (i.e., placing a bid below the estimated 
value) as a consequence of an option value of participation in future auctions. Within a 
procurement setting, Katehakis and Puranam [21] study the cost minimization objective of a 
buyer who wants to procure a fixed number of products and Yildirim [50] considers the optimal 
mechanism for piecewise procurement of large-scale projects. While these studies and our paper 
do not account for capacity constraints, Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer [18] include capacity 
limitations when defining the states of the game and they use empirical highway procurement 
bidding data to develop an estimation method for a repeated auction. Whereas most models 
allow for a different number of bidders in each stage, the PPP model assumes repeated 
competition among a constant set of bidders (like in [14] and [29]) and includes the current 
levels of the bidders’ past experience and the number of projects remaining in the state variable. 
Hence, the PPP model allows for heterogeneity among the bidders. The theoretical model of 
Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer [19] and the empirical studies by De Silva et al. [10] and Wolfram 
[49] account for endogenously appearing asymmetries due to synergies, but in the PPP setting 
bidders may ex ante differ in the cost probability distributions which is also the case in the work 
of Reiβ and Schöndube [37]. Moreover, in contrast to models that study infinite timeframes (e.g., 
[16, 33, 38, 52]), the PPP pipeline has a finite nature which is a logical consequence of the 
magnitude of the projects and the limited budget horizon of governments. 
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The experimental set-up relies on a heuristic approach to derive the equilibrium. Algorithmic 
game theory attempts to deal with the complexity of real-life models [32]. Algorithms that use 
best response reasoning have been successfully implemented for instance for empirical games, 
routing games or dynamic oligopoly models and often limit the search space and the number of 
computationally expensive pay-off calculations (e.g., [13, 42, 47]). Nevertheless, a best response 
heuristic does not always converge and, to the best of our knowledge, formal proofs of 
convergence are limited to super-modular games with unique Nash equilibria [28] and 
congestion games [30]. The experimental results in this paper focus on the scenarios for which 
convergence has occurred. 
Next to its contribution to the operations research field, this paper adds value to the PPP 
project management literature. The number of papers on PPPs has been proliferating and an 
overview of topics can be found in Ke et al. [23] and Tang et al. [44]. Past experiences have led 
to concise lists of success factors and key performance indicators (e.g., [17, 51]). Nevertheless, 
the majority of the studies are limited to attaining single-project success without looking at the 
broader PPP picture. However, empirical results also underline long-term and country-specific 
factors like the country’s government reputation, legal framework and economic stability [2, 8, 
51] or the importance of PPP units in promoting PPPs [45]. In this vein, a consultancy report 
from KPMG [25] argues for efforts to levy barriers to competition and procurement 
inefficiencies. The report suggests that the pipeline concept could be beneficial, but this has not 
been covered within the academic PPP literature. Additionally, modeling the expensive bidding 
process has not received substantial consideration. Within this context, Zitron [54] developed a 
model to study the bid/no bid decision in function of the risk of bidding and the project risk 
itself. Especially for PPPs, the quality aspect of the bid proposals requires considerable attention. 
Without specifically referring to PPPs, Perng et al. [34] discuss a bidding game that 
experimentally assesses the economically most advantageous bidding setting. In a single-project 
setting, Ho [15] included government reimbursements to incentivize bidders to invest in more 
qualitative bids into a game-theoretical PPP bidding model. De Clerck and Demeulemeester [9] 
relate to Ho’s work, but include project contingencies and heterogeneous bidders into their 
bidding model. The authors claim that a bid cost reimbursement could be an effective tool to 
increase competition. Apart from the aforementioned procurement studies, the majority of the 
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PPP studies consider a one-to-one relationship between a public entity and a single contractor to 
study pricing mechanisms and risk allocation negotiations [9]. 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Competitive bidding procedure 
This paper extends the work of De Clerck and Demeulemeester [9] in which a single-project 
environment has been analyzed. The analysis of competitive bidding for PPP projects resulted in 
a complex procurement auction environment. In a stage 𝑧, contractors that are invited for the 
tender will first determine how much effort they are willing to put into the bid preparation. This 
investment may result in a reduction of the cost uncertainty as well as in a cost advantage. 
Moreover, the heterogeneity among contractors leads to more advantageous cost probability 
distribution functions for more experienced players, which means a smaller variance and a lower 
average expected cost. After the investment decision, each contractor 𝑝 estimates the project cost 
which is subject to estimation errors. Next, the mark-up is determined and applied to the 
estimated cost, resulting in the bid for project 𝑧. The lowest bidding contractor is granted the 
project. Afterwards, the tendering procedure for stage 𝑧 + 1 is initiated. The sequential model 
adds an additional feature: winning a project in the sequence results in additional experience for 
all subsequent projects. 
3.2 Sequential bidding model 
Given is a commonly known project sequence 𝒵 ≔ {1,2, … , 𝑍}. We want to identify the 
strategy equilibrium of the subgame 𝑒 = (𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑃) that defines the initial experience setting 
of the players of the game. This setting is a stochastic game, as has been introduced by Shapley 
[39]. A stochastic game is a finite or infinite dynamic game that is played by one or more players 
with probabilistic transitions between a finite number of states. In this setting, the players are 
assumed to be long-lived and to have unlimited capacity to perform all the projects of the 
pipeline. In each stage of the sequential game, the contractors want to optimize their expected 
pay-off which consists of the instantaneous pay-off of the current stage and an expected 
continuation value of the pay-offs in future stages. We are looking at Markov strategies and 
identify a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) as presented by Maskin and Tirole [26]. This is 
justified as the current play is only influenced by the expected pay-offs of future projects on the 
one hand and the state variable on the other hand. For a given project or stage 𝑧 ∈ 𝒵 from the 
sequence, we determine the current state 𝜃𝑧 ∈ Θ𝑧 as the combination of the current experience 
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levels and the number of remaining projects in the sequence 𝑍 − 𝑧 or 𝜃𝑧 = (𝑒, 𝑍 − 𝑧). The 
history ℎ𝑧 at stage 𝑧 is summarized into this state variable. Consequently, we assume that past 
investment and mark-up decisions solely impact the current behavior by having won or lost the 
tender. For a given state, a set of actions 𝒜𝑝
𝑧 = 𝒜𝑝
𝑧(𝜃𝑧) is available for each player. We assume 
that the set of available actions is the same in every state of the game, so that we can refer to the 
set of actions as 𝒜𝑝. An action 𝑎𝑝
𝑧  in a state 𝜃𝑧 is composed of two elements: the amount of pre-
tender investment 𝑖(𝑎𝑝
𝑧|𝜃𝑧) a player 𝑝 is willing to adopt and which is expressed as a percentage 
of an initial cost base equal to 1 and the mark-up 𝑚(𝑎𝑝
𝑧|𝜃𝑧) defined as a percentage that is 
applied to the estimated project cost. The vector 𝑎𝑧 = (𝑎1
𝑧, … , 𝑎𝑃
𝑧 ) represents the action profile or 
the combination of actions for all 𝑃 players. If we define the set of players as 𝒫 and the set of 
action profiles as 𝒜 =×𝑝∈𝒫 𝒜𝑝, then we determine the transition probabilities 𝒬 from 𝒜 × Θ
z 
to Θz+1 so that 𝒬(𝜃𝑧+1|𝑎𝑧, 𝜃𝑧) represents the probability of arriving in state 𝜃𝑧+1 from the 
current state 𝜃𝑧 with an action profile 𝑎𝑧. For each stage 𝑧, the combination of a state 𝜃𝑧 and an 
action profile 𝑎𝑧 leads to an expected pay-off vector 𝜋𝑧(𝑎𝑧|𝜃𝑧) of dimension ℝ𝑃. Each player-
specific element 𝜋𝑝
𝑧(𝑎𝑧|𝜃𝑧) of this vector is the sum of an instantaneous pay-off 𝜌𝑝
𝑧(𝑎𝑧|𝜃𝑧) and 
the player’s expected value 𝒱𝑝
𝑧+1(𝑎𝑧|𝜃𝑧) for the future stages {𝑧 + 1, … , 𝑍} discounted with a 
factor 𝛿 (0 < 𝛿 ≤ 1). Consequently, the player-specific expected pay-off function that player 𝑝 
wants to optimize at stage 𝑧 equals:  
𝜋𝑝
𝑧(𝑎𝑧|𝜃𝑧) = 𝜌𝑝
𝑧(𝑎𝑧|𝜃𝑧) + 𝛿𝒱𝑝
𝑧+1(𝑎𝑧|𝜃𝑧) 
with 
𝒱𝑝
𝑧+1(𝑎𝑧|𝜃𝑧) = ∑ 𝒬(𝜃𝑧+1|𝑎𝑧 , 𝜃𝑧)𝜋𝑝
𝑧+1(𝑎𝑧+1|𝜃𝑧+1) 
𝜃𝑧+1∈Θ𝑧+1
 
and for each 𝑧 ∈ 𝒵 and 𝜃𝑧 ∈ Θ𝑧. This dynamic recursion is solved backwards, starting at 𝑧 = 𝑍 
for all 𝜃𝑍 and defining 𝒱𝑝
𝑍+1(𝑎𝑍|𝜃𝑍) = 0 for all 𝑝. Define 𝑎∗𝑍 as the resulting equilibrium 
action profile, so that 𝜋𝑝
𝑍(𝑎∗𝑍|𝜃𝑍) is maximized. With this information, and assuming that 
players adopt equilibrium behavior for all subsequent games, the equilibrium for stage 𝑧 = 𝑍 − 1 
can now be calculated. As soon as 𝑧 = 0, a strategy equilibrium for the sequential game has been 
obtained. Fig. 1 represents an example of an optimal strategy pattern and clarifies the notation.  
[FIGURE 1 TO BE INSERTED HERE] 
3.3 Model assumptions  
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The model assumptions of De Clerck and Demeulemeester [9] are equivalent in the sequential 
environment. First of all, we assume that the state of the game, which consists of the experience 
levels and the remaining projects in the pipeline, is common knowledge to all players. Moreover, 
the general risk structure of the projects is the same for all the projects in the pipeline. That 
means that, without considering experience and pre-tender investment, the ex ante cost 
probability distribution and its parameters do not change. The experience and the current 
investment level may change the shape of the cost probability distribution. The model only 
incurs project-specific investment efforts, so that investments only directly affect the current 
stage and do not contribute to the knowledge base of future stages. The experience as well as the 
investment have an impact on the expected value and the variance of the cost probability 
distribution. A user-defined experience scale [0,10] is defined with 𝑒𝑢 the number of intervals on 
the scale. Equivalently, 𝑒𝑢 refers to the number of projects won beyond which no extra 
experience can be adopted. Consequently, the conversion of experience level 𝑒𝑝 of player 𝑝 on 
the experience scale [0,10] is obtained by: 10 ∗
𝑒𝑝
𝑒𝑢
= 𝑒𝑝
𝑐. If 𝑒𝑢 = 2, an inexperienced player has 
𝑒𝑝 = 𝑒𝑝
𝑐 = 0 and a medium experienced and a highly experienced player have levels 𝑒𝑝 = 1 
(𝑒𝑝
𝑐 = 5) and 𝑒𝑝 = 2 (𝑒𝑝
𝑐 = 10) respectively. The impact of experience and investment is 
implemented with diminishing scale effects and moreover, Gaussian distributions are assumed. 
Consequently, the contractor-specific project cost probability distribution 𝑐𝑝
𝑧(𝑎𝑝
𝑧|𝜃𝑧) is of the 
form 𝑁 (1 + 𝑔𝑝(𝑎𝑝
𝑧|𝜃𝑧), 𝜎𝑝
2(𝑎𝑝
𝑧|𝜃𝑧)). We assume that 𝑔𝑝(. ) represents the fraction of the cost 
that is accountable for the lack of experience or investment. The model assumes 
𝑔𝑝(𝑎𝑝
𝑧 , 𝑒𝑝(𝜃
𝑧)) =  𝛽𝑖𝑒
−𝜇𝑖(100𝑖(𝑎𝑝
𝑧 |𝜃𝑧)) + 𝛽𝑒𝑒
−𝜇𝑒𝑒𝑝
𝑐(𝜃𝑧) which means that the expected value of 
the contractor-specific cost distribution at a particular state of the game is dependent on the 
amount of investment and the experience level. The parameters 𝛽𝑖 and 𝛽𝑒 reflect the maximum 
cost impact for players who do not invest and players without experience, respectively. 𝜇𝑖 and 𝜇𝑒 
represent the associated growth parameters. Moreover, the variance of the distribution is 
dependent on the experience level and the investment. The total variance of the cost distribution 
is composed of an uncontrollable part that is equivalent for all players, a part attributed to the 
(lack of) experience and a fraction related to the (lack of) investment. Implementation-wise, we 
assume 𝜎𝑝
2(𝑎𝑝
𝑧 , 𝑒𝑝(𝜃
𝑧)) = 𝜎2 + (𝛾𝑖𝑒
−𝜆𝑖(100𝑖(𝑎𝑝
𝑧 |𝜃𝑧)))
2
+ (𝛾𝑒𝑒
−𝜆𝑒𝑒𝑝
𝑐(𝜃𝑧))
2
 with 𝛾𝑖 the share of the 
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variance or risk that is caused by a lack of investment and 𝛾𝑒 related to the knowledge impact of 
experience and associated growth parameters 𝜆𝑖 and 𝜆𝑒. Assume, for instance that 𝑒𝑢 = 2, 
𝜎 = 0.05, 𝛾𝑖 = 𝛾𝑒 = 𝛽𝑖 = 𝛽𝑒 = 0.1, 𝜆𝑒 = 𝜇𝑒 = 𝜆𝑖 = 𝜇𝑖 = 0.25, then a player with no 
experience and a 1% investment choice has a cost probability distributed as 
𝑁(1.17788,0.01856) and for a player with experience level 1 (𝑒𝑝
𝑐 = 5) and a 2% investment 
choice, we get 𝑁(1.08930,0.00699). When a contractor 𝑝 estimates the project cost 𝐸𝑝?̃?, which 
is generated from the cost probability distribution 𝑐𝑝
𝑧(. ), he applies a mark-up to the expected 
cost to arrive at the bid (1 + 𝑚(𝑎𝑝
𝑧|𝜃𝑧)) 𝐸𝑝?̃?. Consequently, the bid probability distribution given 
a player’s action 𝑎𝑝
𝑧 and a state 𝜃𝑧 equals 𝑏𝑝
𝑧(𝑎𝑝
𝑧|𝜃𝑧) and is characterized by the normal 
distribution 𝑁 ((1 + 𝑚(𝑎𝑝
𝑧|𝜃𝑧)) (1 + 𝑔𝑝(𝑎𝑝
𝑧|𝜃𝑧)) , (1 + 𝑚(𝑎𝑝
𝑧|𝜃𝑧))
2
𝜎𝑝
2(𝑎𝑝
𝑧|𝜃𝑧)) with the 
associated cumulative bid probability distribution 𝐵𝑝
𝑧. It is assumed that the lowest bidding 
contractor is granted the project, so the probability of winning contract 𝑧 with 𝑃 players is 
𝑞𝑝
𝑧(𝑎𝑧|𝜃𝑧) =  ∫ 𝑏𝑝
𝑧(𝑥𝑝)
+∞
−∞
[∏ (1 − 𝐵𝑘
𝑧(𝑥𝑘))𝑘∈𝒫\{𝑝} ]𝑑𝑥𝑝. These probabilities also refer to the 
transition probabilities 𝒬(𝜃𝑧+1|𝑎𝑧 , 𝜃𝑧) to move from a state 𝜃𝑧 to 𝜃𝑧+1. The contractor that wins 
the project receives the proposed bid and pays the actual cost (1 + 𝑔𝑝(. )) of the project and the 
monetary investment effort. Additionally, this player obtains an updated experience level in all 
future stages of the game, i.e., until 𝑒𝑝 = 𝑒𝑢. The pay-off of the other contractors is determined 
by the lost investment. Nevertheless, the government might reimburse losing bidders for the 
investment efforts with a fraction 𝑑 (Section 4.5). Consequently, the instantaneous expected pay-
off for a player 𝑝 in an action profile 𝑎𝑧 and state 𝜃𝑧 is given by: 
𝜌𝑝
𝑧(𝑎𝑧|𝜃𝑧) = 𝑞𝑝
𝑧(𝑎𝑧|𝜃𝑧) (𝐸[𝐵𝑝?̃?|𝑝 has won] − (1 + 𝑔𝑝 (𝑎𝑝
𝑧|𝑒𝑝(𝜃
𝑧))) − 𝑖(𝑎𝑝
𝑧|𝜃𝑧)) −
(1 − 𝑞𝑝
𝑧(𝑎𝑧|𝜃𝑧)) (1 − 𝑑)𝑖(𝑎𝑝
𝑧|𝜃𝑧). 𝐸[𝐵𝑝?̃?|𝑝 has won] refers to the ex post expected proposal 
given that the player has won the tender and is found as the conditional expectation: 
𝐸[𝐵𝑝?̃?|𝐵𝑝?̃? < 𝐵𝑘
?̃?, ∀𝑘 ≠ 𝑝] = ∫
𝑥𝑝
𝑞𝑝
𝑧 𝑏𝑝
𝑧(𝑥𝑝) ∏ (1 − 𝐵𝑘
𝑧(𝑥𝑝))𝑘∈𝒫\{𝑝}
+∞
−∞
𝑑𝑥𝑝. In order to arrive at the 
total expected pay-off for this state, the discounted player’s values for the future stages need to 
be added to the expected instantaneous pay-off.  
3.4 Solution algorithm  
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In each state, we define the equilibrium action profile that determines the equilibrium 
investment percentage and mark-up percentage for the players. Finding this equilibrium is a hard 
problem and a heuristic approach is developed. The equilibrium of the dynamic programming 
problem is first determined for the states that are related to the final project in the pipeline. Based 
on a backward induction reasoning, the equilibria for each stage 𝑧 are determined, assuming 
equilibrium play in the stages {𝑧 + 1, … , 𝑍}. So for a state variable 𝜃𝑧 = (𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑃, 𝑍 − 𝑧) 
that is composed of the experience levels of all players and the number of remaining projects in 
the pipeline, we want to derive an equilibrium action profile 𝑎∗ = (𝑖1, 𝑚1, … , 𝑖𝑃, 𝑚𝑃), which is a 
vector with dimension ℝ2∗𝑃. If no confusion is possible, subscripts and superscripts related to the 
state variable are omitted so as to avoid notational complexity. In order to determine the 
equilibrium, a straightforward best response heuristic is applied. In each iteration of the heuristic, 
the algorithm approaches the best response for each player sequentially, given the actions of the 
opponents. Once none of the bidders can improve their response given the opponents’ actions, 
there is evidence that one might have arrived in an equilibrium. Academic literature only offers 
theoretical proofs for a limited number of circumstances for which the best response algorithm 
converges [6, 47]. Also in the context of the PPP procurement setting, we did not succeed in 
theoretically guaranteeing the convergence of the heuristic, while the computational results 
indicated convergence for the majority of the investigated cases. Due to the complex structure of 
the pay-off function and the infinite set of possible actions, the identification of the best response 
is challenging and time consuming. Therefore, the heuristic uses a combination of an 
electromagnetic algorithm and a local search procedure. It is important to note that there is no 
guarantee that a pure strategy equilibrium exists in the case of an infinite number of actions. The 
algorithm looks into unique equilibria, but of course multiple equilibria might exist and the 
convergence towards a particular equilibrium is path-dependent. Therefore, the algorithm is 
executed for a predefined number of starting points. This repetitive structure accounts for the 
possibility of arriving in alternative equilibria. The pseudo-code for the algorithms can be found 
in Appendix 1. 
3.4.1 Best response determination 
Optimizing the pay-off function for a given set of actions for the opponents (indicated as 𝑎−𝑝) 
is a computationally intensive task because of the structure of the non-linear pay-off response 
function (Fig. 2). There are two decision variables for each player 𝑝 that, together, represent the 
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action 𝑎𝑝: the investment percentage 𝑖𝑝 and the mark-up percentage 𝑚𝑝. The best response 
optimizes argmax𝑎𝑝 𝜋𝑝
𝑧(𝑎𝑝|𝜃
𝑧 , 𝑎−𝑝 ) = 𝜌𝑝
𝑧(𝑎𝑝|𝜃
𝑧 , 𝑎−𝑝) + 𝛿𝒱𝑝
𝑧+1(𝑎𝑝|𝜃
𝑧, 𝑎−𝑝). In order to 
efficiently determine the global optimum, this paper uses an electromagnetism-like mechanism 
for global optimization as has been proposed by Birbil and Fang [4] and whose notation and 
procedure is utilized here. The attraction-repulsion mechanism of the heuristic succeeds in 
efficiently browsing through the entire search space and overcomes the danger of arriving in a 
local minimum, which could be the case when adopting the steepest ascent heuristic. The 
derivation of the best response is a two-step process. Given the action profile of the opponents 
𝑎−𝑝, a set 𝒯 of 𝑇 solutions is initialized. A solution 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯 is represented as 𝑥
𝑡 = (𝑥1
𝑡 , 𝑥2
𝑡), with 
𝑥1
𝑡 ∈ [𝑙1, 𝑢1] the coordinate that refers to the investment level and 𝑥2
𝑡 ∈ [𝑙2, 𝑢2] the coordinate 
that refers to the mark-up level. 𝑙1 and 𝑙2 represent the lower bounds and 𝑢1 and 𝑢2 the upper 
bounds. For each initial point, the expected pay-off for player 𝑝, for whom the best response is 
derived, equals 𝑓𝑝(𝑥
𝑡) = 𝜋𝑝(𝑥
𝑡|𝜃𝑧, 𝑎−𝑝). The best solution is stored as 𝑓𝑝(𝑥
best).  
[FIGURE 2 TO BE INSERTED HERE] 
3.4.1.1 Electromagnetism step 
A charge is calculated for each point, based on the superposition principle of 
electromagnetism theory. The charge represents point 𝑖’s power of attraction or repulsion and is 
calculated by: 𝑞𝑡 = exp (−2 ∗
(𝑓𝑝(𝑥
best)−𝑓𝑝(𝑥
𝑡))
∑ (𝑓𝑝(𝑥best)−𝑓𝑝(𝑥𝑘))
𝑇
𝑘=1
). In the next step, the total forces on each 
point are computed. For the pairwise force calculations, the point that has a higher expected pay-
off, attracts the other point, while the point with a worse pay-off repels the other point. The 
forces and moves are calculated for all but the currently best found point, in order to keep the 
information of the current best point. Furthermore, let 𝐹𝑛
𝑡𝑢 represent the force exerted by point 𝑢 
on point 𝑡 for coordinate 𝑛, with 𝑛 = 1 for the investment direction and 𝑛 = 2 for the mark-up 
direction. Finally, 𝐹𝑛
𝑡 refers to the total force exerted by the other points for coordinate 𝑛. As a 
result, we obtain 𝐹𝑡 = {𝐹1
𝑡, 𝐹2
𝑡} = {∑ 𝐹1
𝑡𝑢, ∑ 𝐹2
𝑡𝑢}𝑢∈𝒯\{𝑡}𝑢∈𝒯\{𝑡}  and the force is represented as:  
𝐹𝑡 = ∑
(−1)𝑤
𝑡𝑢
(𝑥𝑢 − 𝑥𝑡)𝑞𝑡𝑞𝑢
‖𝑥𝑢 − 𝑥𝑡‖2𝑢∈𝒯\{𝑡}
 
 with 𝑤𝑡𝑢 = 0 if 𝑓𝑝(𝑥
𝑡) < 𝑓𝑝(𝑥
𝑢) and 𝑤𝑡𝑢 = 1 if 𝑓𝑝(𝑥
𝑡) ≥ 𝑓𝑝(𝑥
𝑢). In order to move the points, 
the force vector 𝐹𝑡 is normalized into ?̿?𝑡 = 𝐹𝑡/‖𝐹𝑡‖ and a random step length 𝜂 is selected from 
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𝑈(0,1) so that there is a non-zero probability to move to the unvisited regions along the direction 
of 𝐹𝑡. The normalization of the force vector ensures that the new solution is located in the 
feasible region. In conclusion, all but the previously found best point are moved so that for each 
𝑡 ∈ 𝒯\{best} and 𝑛 ∈ {1,2}, the respective coordinate becomes: 
𝑥𝑛
′𝑡 = {
𝑥𝑛
𝑡 + 𝜂?̿?𝑛
𝑡(𝑢𝑛 − 𝑥𝑛
𝑡 )   if ?̿?𝑛
𝑡 > 0
𝑥𝑛
𝑡 − 𝜂?̿?𝑛
𝑡(𝑥𝑛
𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛)    if ?̿?𝑛
𝑡 ≤ 0
 
The procedure is iterated a predefined number of times with the newly found coordinates and 
subsequently, the local search algorithm is executed. 
3.4.1.2 Example 
Consider a two-player situation for which we want to determine the best response for 𝑝 = 1 
and given the action (1,20) for player 2 which refers to a 1% investment percentage and a 20% 
mark-up percentage. Table 1 reports the algorithm values for 𝑇 = 4. The pay-off of player 1 for 
each point 𝑡 is given by 𝑓1(𝑥
𝑡), so that the best pay-off is obtained in point 1. The sum of all the 
differences between the points’ pay-off values and the best pay-off is 0.035589 and the charge 
for point 𝑡 = 2 is found as exp (−2 ∗
0.046640−0.040448
0.035589
). The distance between point 2 and 3 is 
4.4778 and the force that point 3 exerts on point 2 equals 𝐹1
23 = (1.7 − 3.5) ∗
0.7484∗0.7061
4.4778
=
−0.2125 for the investment coordinate and 𝐹2
23 = (16.1 − 20.2) ∗
0.7484∗0.7061
4.4778
= −0.4839 for 
the mark-up coordinate. The forces on point 2’s investment coordinate from the points 1 and 4 
are -0.1022 and 0.0419 respectively, so that the total force 𝐹1
2 = −0.2728. After normalizing 
and generating 𝜂=0.4 as the random variable and defining (𝑙1, 𝑙2) = (0,0) and (𝑢1, 𝑢2) = (5,30), 
the new investment coordinate for 𝑡 = 2 equals 3.5 + 0.4 ∗ (−0.5725) ∗ 3.5 = 2.6985. The 
electromagnetism procedure is iterated with the previously best found point (𝑡 = 1) and with the 
three newly found points. 
[TABLE 1 TO BE INSERTED HERE] 
3.4.1.3 Local search step 
The points that result from the electromagnetism step are the input for a local search 
procedure around each of these points. In each iteration, the investment and mark-up coordinate 
are modified by applying a random transformation around the original point using a step length 
vector 𝛼 and a randomly generated point 𝜅 from a uniform distribution that determines the 
amount and direction of the perturbation. If the new point results in a higher pay-off, the 
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coordinates are updated and the local search procedure continues from the newly found point. In 
the end, the best known solution is updated. 
3.4.1.4 Example 
Let us start from the initial point (1.48,21.37) while the action for the second player is 
(1,20). This results in a pay-off of 0.049456. Assume that the step length for the investment is 
0.3 and 2 for the mark-up. For each coordinate, a random variable is generated from 𝑈(0,1): 
𝜅 = 0.09 for the investment coordinate and 𝜅 = 0.86 for the mark-up coordinate. In order to 
allow for positive and negative perturbations, we subtract 0.5 from the randomly generated 
number, so the new investment coordinate becomes 1.48 + (0.09 − 0.5) ∗ 0.3 = 1.36 and for 
the mark-up shift, the mark-up in the new point equals 21.37 + (0.86 − 0.5) ∗ 2 = 22.09. The 
point (1.36,22.09) leads to a pay-off of 0.0501 and consequently the local search continues from 
this outperforming point. 
3.4.2 Equilibrium selection 
For a starting point that is randomly selected from the entire action profile space, the best 
response heuristic is executed until the convergence criterion is satisfied. Convergence occurs as 
soon as no significant pay-off improvements have been registered in a pre-defined number of 
loops and as long as a minimum number of loops 𝐵𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑅𝐸𝑃 has been executed. Moreover, the 
algorithm stops when the number of loops reaches 𝐵𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑅𝐸𝑃. The convergence is path-
dependent, so the algorithm is repeated for 𝑅 starting points. Afterwards, the 𝑅 resulting action 
profiles are clustered according to a distance criterion resulting in 𝐶 clusters. Points are 
sequentially assigned to the cluster for which the distance between the point and the average 
coordinates of the cluster is minimal and smaller than 𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇. Alternatively, a new cluster is 
formed. Within each cluster, the coordinate-by-coordinate average of all points belonging to the 
cluster are calculated together with the pay-off profile. Clusters with a number of points smaller 
than 𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇 are removed as these might have resulted from a local optimum. The 
second step in the equilibrium selection process compares the averages of the clusters and 
removes any clusters that are dominated by other clusters (i.e., a cluster that has higher pay-offs 
for all players). Subsequently, the clusters are ranked according to the sum of the average pay-
offs of all players and the cluster with the highest total pay-off is moving to the refinement stage. 
The refinement stage executes the best response heuristic again to confirm whether the particular 
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action profile is an equilibrium. If this is confirmed, the resulting reported equilibrium for the 
state is stored and is used to compute the equilibria in the stage 𝑧 − 1.  
3.5 Experimental setting 
The computer experiments have been executed in Microsoft Visual Studio 2010 and Wolfram 
Mathematica 8.0 performs the pay-off calculations. As the risk profile of PPP projects deserves 
major interest, we are mainly interested in the effect of the level of uncertainty, which is 
reflected by the knowledge impact parameters 𝛾𝑖 and 𝛾𝑒. Moreover, it is necessary to account for 
the computational effort that the equilibrium determination requires. Therefore, three sets of 
scenarios have been developed. Each scenario is executed for every unique combination of 
experience levels. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 give insights into the general dynamics of the equilibrium 
and rely on the four scenarios that are determined by the parameter values of Table 2. We will 
refer to these as follows: Sc.1 (𝛾𝑖 = 𝛾𝑒 = 0.1), Sc. 2 (𝛾𝑖 = 0.1, 𝛾𝑒 = 0.05), Sc. 3 (𝛾𝑖 = 0.05, 𝛾𝑒 =
0.1) and Sc. 4 (𝛾𝑖 = 𝛾𝑒 = 0.05). Secondly, Section 4.4 covers a case (Sc. 5) with extreme risks 
(𝛾𝑖 = 0.2, 𝛾𝑒 = 0.1). Thirdly, the impact of introducing government compensation in Sc. 1 and 
Sc. 5 is assessed in Section 4.5. Finally, Section 4.6 highlights some noteworthy robustness 
aspects from a more extensive sensitivity analysis of the cost impact related parameters in a 
setting with only two experience intervals (𝑒𝑢 = 2). Besides, after trading off computation times 
and the level of accuracy and assessing the speed of convergence, the algorithm variables are 
tuned as shown in Table A1.1 of Appendix 1. 
[TABLE 2 TO BE INSERTED HERE] 
4. Experimental results 
4.1 Algorithm performance 
For each state of the game, the algorithm looks for the state-specific action equilibrium. As 
the algorithm is based on a best response heuristic, it is important to assess the convergence 
performance. A scale with 𝑒𝑢 = 5 intervals leads to six experience levels, which results in 21 
experience vectors (0,0), (0,1), (0,2), (0,3), (0,4), (0,5), (1,1), (1,2), …, (5,5) in a two-player 
setting. Equivalently, a three-player setting with five intervals results in 56 experience vectors. 
Convergence occurs when the algorithm stops before the maximum number of replications has 
been reached. For Sc. 1-4, the convergence criterion is met up to a three-project pipeline (𝑍 = 3) 
in the three-player setting. In the two-player setting, convergence issues appeared solely in a 
three-project pipeline for subgames (0,4) and (0,5) in which experienced players are randomizing 
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within a small area of the action profile space of Sc. 1 between actions without investment on the 
one hand and with a small investment (0.5%) and a slightly higher (1%) mark-up.  
In the convergent cases, given the parameters in Table A1.1, the search procedure converges 
already after less than 𝐵𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑅𝐸𝑃 loops towards a specific search region in the action profile 
matrix. Changing the players’ sequence of best response selection does not modify this tendency. 
In the first loops of the best response algorithm, the electromagnetism is mainly attributable for 
the selection of the best response, while in later iterations the local search procedure will be 
mainly responsible for the determination of the optimizing step. In the vast majority of the cases, 
the algorithm reports a single cluster. Only in the two- and three-project context of Sc. 1 and Sc. 
2, two equilibria are apparent for the mature markets (4,4,5) and (4,5,5). These equilibria are 
characterized by a zero investment by one of the equally experienced players, while the other 
does not invest.  
4.2 Impact of the pipeline on the first project procurement 
[TABLE 3 TO BE INSERTED HERE] 
Table 3 reports the statistical results of the scenario-by-scenario analysis for the strategic 
actions in the tender for the first project in a single-, a two- and a three-project environment with 
two and three players. Within the stochastic game notation, the table compares the actions of the 
states for a constant experience vector 𝑒, but for a variable number of remaining projects in the 
pipeline. So, if a state is represented as 𝜃𝑧 = (𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑍 − 𝑧), this section compares the actions for 
𝜃1 = (. , . ,0) with 𝜃1 = (. , . ,1) and 𝜃1 = (. , . ,2). A parametric paired t-test has been used to 
study the paired observations. In order to guarantee the results’ robustness, the output of the non-
parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test is also reported. The statistical tests confirm the initial 
expectation that mark-ups are lowered when extra projects are introduced both in the two-player 
as well as in the three-player case. The drop in mark-ups is the greatest for the inexperienced 
players, resulting in more competition within the heterogeneous market. An analysis of the 
investment dynamics tends to point towards decreasing investment percentages when more 
projects are in the pipeline. Conditioning on the experience levels for the comparison of a three- 
versus a single-project case with three players indicates an insignificant average absolute drop of 
0.001% for inexperienced players (p-value=0.106), towards a significant average 0.02% drop (p-
value=0.004) for players with 𝑒1 = 1 and 𝑒1 = 2 and a drop of 0.045% for players with 
maximum experience (p-value=0.0003). Looking at the two-player environment in which the 
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investments are generally higher, the results show a significant decrease of 0.24% and 0.05% for 
players with experience levels 0 and 1 respectively (p-values 0.001 and 0.025), but do report a 
significant increase for players from experience level 3 onwards.  
Eventually, the decreasing mark-ups also lead to lower bidder’s pay-offs for the first project 
and a lower project procurement cost for the government. According to the aggregated scenario 
outcomes, the mark-up and consequently also the pay-off drop is largest for the inexperienced 
players and in the subgames where mainly inexperienced players are involved. On average, a 
decrease of 13.53% in the pay-off has been reported in the two-player case and 19.35% in the 
three-player case when moving from a single-project to a three-project pipeline. Additionally, 
inexperienced players are sometimes willing to suffer a loss in the first project in order to win the 
project and obtain a greater experience level for the next project. In general, the percentage-wise 
drop in pay-offs has a negative trend in the experience level. The reduced mark-ups have positive 
repercussions on the government expenditures. The government cost for the first project in a 
three-project pipeline is 1.12% lower in two-player subgames and 0.92% lower in three-player 
subgames than in the case without a pipeline. In immature markets, savings of 5.14% and 4.13% 
might be realized in two- and three-player settings respectively. 
Furthermore, an ANOVA study of the investment percentage in function of the model 
parameters and the state-defining values with first-order interaction effects could not support 
significance at the 5% level of any of the terms related to the number of projects in the pipeline 
in the three-player case. In the two-player model, both the interaction term of the experience 
level 𝑒1 and the number of projects in the pipeline as well as the interaction term of the 
competitor’s experience level 𝑒2 and the pipeline length are highly significant (p-values equal 
4.6*10
-7
 and 9.8*10
-5
 respectively). The ANOVA models for the mark-ups, on the other hand, 
reveal the main effect and the interaction effects of the pipeline variable. We refer to Appendix 2 
for the full ANOVA results. The ANOVA tests also underline the interaction with the players’ 
experience vector that defines the state variable. Tables 4 and 5 show the action dynamics in the 
bidding behavior for the first project for a player with experience level 𝑒1 with respect to a 
variable number of projects in the pipeline. Only the scenarios that involve players with 
experience level zero up to two are reported, but analogous results are apparent for the remaining 
scenarios. Moving towards a multi-project environment considerably reduces the mark-ups for 
the inexperienced players. According to these tables, only players with a competitive advantage 
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over all their competitors (e.g., the subgames (𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑒3)=(1,0,0), (2,0,0) or (2,0,1) and 
(𝑒1, 𝑒2)=(1,0), (2,0) or (2,1)) have a tendency to invest more in a multi-project environment than 
in a single-project setting, which means that players who were already in a beneficial position 
opt to strengthen their advantage even more. The cases in which a player has an experience level 
that is equal to or lower than at least one of his opponents point towards decreasing investment 
percentages. Also for maximally experienced players, we do not find significance for increasing 
investment levels, regardless of the experience level of the opponents.  
[TABLES 4 AND 5 TO BE INSERTED HERE] 
4.3 Impact of a pipeline on the average expected bidding behavior 
Section 4.2 solely looked at the bidding dynamics of the first project of the pipeline. A second 
approach to analyze the dynamics of the bidding behavior compares the average expected 
investment and mark-up percentages of the players over the entire pipeline. Given the optimal 
action profiles 𝑎∗𝑧, the average investment level over the entire pipeline is calculated by taking 
the sum of the investment levels of each state 𝜃𝑧 = (. , . , 𝑍 − 𝑧) for each 𝑧 weighted with the 
probability that this state occurs. Consider the three-project pipeline and initial experience vector 
(𝑒1, 𝑒2) = (0,0) of Fig. 1. The expected average investment percentage for player 1 equals 
(0.6% + 0.43(1.3% + 0.50 ∗ 1.6% + 0.50 ∗ 1.3%) + 0.57(0.6% + 0.43 ∗ 1.3% + 0.57 ∗
0.8%))/3 ≈ 0.9%. These averages are then compared to the situation in which a single project 
is tendered three times, which means that only the actions and transition probabilities of the state 
variables 𝜃𝑧 = (. , . ,1) are considered. The average expected pay-offs and government cost may 
be obtained in a similar fashion. Table 6 reports the statistical analysis of the differences and 
agrees with the previously stated findings. The former mark-up results are confirmed so that, 
from a procurement perspective, bidding becomes more aggressive in the case of a project 
pipeline than when projects are tendered without communicating the pipeline. The analysis of the 
average investment efforts in the experiment show that the pipeline concept does on average not 
incur extra investment efforts. Nonetheless, conditioning on the experience level reveals the 
experience-dependent response. The differences in the dynamics are also attributed to the 
competitive position of the player with respect to the opponents. In the model, pre-tender 
investment results in a reduction of the uncertainty, so that sometimes more accurate estimations 
point towards higher project costs. Consequently, bidders might prefer to be less informed and 
play with the mark-up, win a project and use the experience for future projects.  
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[TABLE 6 TO BE INSERTED HERE] 
4.4 High-risk situation 
A change of the 𝛾𝑖 parameter of Sc. 1 to a value of 0.2 refers to a case with high project-
related risk (Sc. 5). The observation of the three-player equilibrium results has led to three 
findings. Firstly, not all subgames could guarantee convergence. In the subgames (0,0,4) and 
(0,0,5) with a single project for instance, the inexperienced players are looping over strategy 
profiles in which they both participate or one stays out. Consequently, we might expect that there 
is an equilibrium in mixed strategies. As the results of a multi-project pipeline rely on the 
outcome of the single-project case, this non-convergence effect acts as a bullwhip to earlier 
states of the stochastic game. Secondly, among all scenarios, there are only two cases for which 
the equilibrium allows participation for all players for the single-project case: subgame (0,0,0) 
with a 2.1% investment and a 25% mark-up for all participants and subgame (1,1,1) with a 2.4% 
investment and a 21% mark-up. In all other subgames, the reported equilibrium always suggests 
that one player should stay out of this engagement (i.e., 0% investment and 50% mark-up). 
Thirdly, adding extra projects has the same consequences as described earlier, but players who 
applied a no-participation action in the single-project case, will still prefer to stay out of the 
market. As a result, the model argues that it might be unsustainable to invite three contractors for 
the bid preparation stage in a high-risk project environment. Therefore, the equilibria of a two-
player setting are of very high interest. In this vein, the previous results seem to be robust: 
everyone participates, mark-ups decrease in the length of the pipeline and players with a 
competitive advantage over their opponent tend to invest more, but the investment gaps are 
small. Hence, levelled strategic behavior is expected if uncertainty is highly project-dependent. 
4.5 Government reimbursement 
In general, one might say that the introduction of a pipeline leads to fiercer competition from 
a mark-up perspective. Nevertheless, the inexperienced bidders are still significantly less willing 
to invest in research, which is especially the case in a three-player setting. Therefore, a 
government reimbursement might help to level the playing field from an investment perspective. 
The government determines a compensation percentage 𝑑 that reflects the fraction of the 
investment efforts that is reimbursed to all losing bidders. Table 7 summarizes the main 
characteristics of the equilibrium results for Sc. 1 and high-risk Sc. 5 in a two-player setting and 
for Sc.1 in the three-player case. The figures use a similar approach as in Section 4.3, so that we 
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look at the average bidding behavior, the average pay-off and the average government 
expenditure over the entire three-project pipeline.  
[TABLE 7 TO BE INSERTED HERE] 
If two players are prequalified, the investment willingness is relatively symmetric for both 
players, both in the low-risk as well as in the high-risk case. An introduction of a compensation 
raises the investment willingness. The average mark-up percentages tend to decrease to the level 
of 40% compensation in the low-risk case, while they increase from 40% compensation onwards 
in the high-risk setting. Of course, this reimbursement involves additional expenditures for the 
government, but these extra costs can be partly offset by the savings that result from the pipeline 
concept. In the low-risk case with a three-project pipeline, a compensation between 20% and 
40% would lead to optimal results: an investment increase and a government expenditure 
decrease. Interestingly, the average government expenditure in the high-risk setting is lower than 
in the low-risk environment. Moreover, both players have a considerable investment willingness, 
making the introduction of a reimbursement policy obsolete, because it would only increase the 
government cost and inflate the contractors’ profits.  
Three-player competition will generally lead to fiercer competition and a lower government 
cost. Nevertheless, Table 7 shows that without compensation, it rarely happens that all players of 
a particular subgame invest. The use of compensation overcomes this dynamic in the majority of 
the subgames, resulting in a higher average investment. In the subgames where inexperienced 
players are competing against two mature contractors though, the inexperienced player moves to 
an equilibrium action in which he does not participate. On average, a compensation of 60% 
together with a pipeline of three projects is cheaper than a situation without compensation and 
without a pipeline. So, in the case governments aim for three competing consortia, a combination 
of both policies leads to promising results. Section 4.4 highlights the mixed equilibrium behavior 
of the high-risk case, which prevents us from giving a full analysis of the compensation 
mechanism. Nevertheless, the experiments show that an 80% reimbursement levies the 
convergence issue and would ensure that all players of the subgame invest in 46 out of the 56 
subgames. For the ten remaining vectors, the 80% reimbursement does not serve as a sufficient 
incentive to make the inexperienced player who is facing two players with an 𝑒𝑝 of at least 2 to 
invest more. Without a compensation, it is only the case in two out of 56 subgames that all 
participants invest, while one player does not participate in all the other subgames. Nevertheless, 
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in this high-risk setting, it is very expensive to attribute these compensations. Consequently, this 
analysis suggests the policy to prequalify only two contractors in a high-risk setting, while a 
three-contractor environment with an investment reimbursement incurs optimal results in a low-
risk setting. As the investment percentages reflect the willingness of the contractor to invest, it 
should evidently be the government’s priority to reduce the (non-value adding) investment 
requirements.  
4.6 Additional scenarios 
In order to investigate the robustness of the results, a full factorial 2
4
 design has been set up 
with two levels (i.e., 0.05 and 0.1) for the parameters 𝛾𝑖, 𝛾𝑒, 𝛽𝑖 and 𝛽𝑒. The scenarios have been 
executed for each subgame (i.e., every possible combination of the experience levels) in a two- 
and three-player setting with 𝑍 = {1,2,3}. For this robustness study, only two experience 
intervals are considered, so that 𝑒𝑢 = 2 and a player’s experience level is 0, 1 or 2.  
First of all, the results for the states with experience vectors (0,2) and (0,0,2) often did not 
converge (i.e., in 11 out of 16 scenarios and 5 out of 16 scenarios respectively). In these 
instances, the algorithm loops between different action profiles. The inexperienced players mix 
their choice between no investment and a high mark-up and a moderate investment with a low 
mark-up. The experienced player responds accordingly with a low or a high mark-up. It is 
especially when the parameters that are related to the experiential advantage (𝛾𝑒 and 𝛽𝑒) are high 
that these convergence issues occur. Nevertheless, the dynamics of the previous sections are 
confirmed by this sensitivity study. Mark-ups are decreasing in the number of projects, 
regardless of the number of players and their respective experience levels. Concerning the 
investments, the players who have a competitive advantage in the initial stage of the game 
increase the investment willingness when the project pipeline grows larger.  
The limited number of experience intervals underlines the importance of winning a project 
early in the pipeline. Therefore, the percentage-wise impact of the pipeline on the mark-ups is 
greater than when 𝑒𝑢 = 5. According to the aggregated scenario outcomes, the pay-off drop for 
the first project of a three-project pipeline is largest for the inexperienced players and in 
subgames in which inexperienced players are involved. On average, a decrease of 73% in the 
pay-off has been reported in the two-player case and 109% in the three-player case when moving 
from a single-project to a three-project pipeline. Consequently, inexperienced players are willing 
to suffer a loss in the first project in order to win it and obtain a greater experience level for the 
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next project. The pay-off drops for the medium experienced player equal 20% and 33% for the 
two- and three-player setting respectively and for the player with maximum experience, this 
amounts to an 8% and a 17% drop. As a result, the combined sensitivity results also confirm the 
reduction in the government expenditures. A three-project pipeline reduces the procurement cost 
of the first project with 1.7% in subgames with two players and with 2.2% in three-player 
subgames.  
4.7 Practitioners’ view 
Along the course of the research project, a number of international contracting companies, 
Belgian and Australian public institutions and a set of advisory firms have been interviewed to 
provide feedback on the models and the results. They all believe in the positive impact of a 
project pipeline and its capability of increasing competition. For contractors, it is a means to 
spread budgets and risk over multiple projects, although mature companies believe that the 
pipelines will limit their profits because of the stronger competitive forces. Another consequence 
of the theoretical findings is that governments might consider to split up large-scale 
infrastructure projects into a sequence of smaller projects. As a result, also small contractors, for 
whom the bid costs might become a financial burden, benefit from entering the market. If a 
government wants to ensure to keep the competition going and to avoid a situation in which 
contractors become too comfortable in their mature position, they might have to put effort in 
cementing the pipeline so that contractors have sufficient belief in the trustworthy pipeline. In 
addition, practitioners also underline the importance of reducing the bidding cost in general and 
of investing in the efficiency of the procurement process [25]. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper studies the impact of a pipeline on the dynamic bidding behavior in a PPP setting. 
Governments do not always have the opportunity to foresee the budget for these risky and 
expensive projects in the long term. Nevertheless, public institutions in Canada and Australia for 
instance do succeed in maintaining and cementing a considerable project pipeline. The dynamic 
procurement format has been translated into a sequential procurement auction model in which 
contractors that are heterogeneous in their cost probability distributions will determine their 
sequential strategy over the course of a commonly known pipeline and a constant set of bidders. 
These bidders can, at each stage, modify their ex ante expected cost distributions by their 
investment decision. Being granted a project results in a knowledge and cost advantage for future 
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projects. An experimental study has been performed to gain initial insight into the optimal 
strategy. A method to gradually derive the Markov equilibrium has been presented. Under the 
assumptions that outline the scope of the paper, the results support the hypothesis that mark-ups 
tend to decrease when more projects are included in the pipeline, regardless of the number of 
bidders. In this vein, the mark-up result is in line with the contemporary sequential auction 
theory literature. Consequently, bidders are willing to accept lower profits if this might lead to 
future benefits. Moreover, we have assumed that the continuation value of the final project has 
been set to zero, which actually even amplifies this finding. As a consequence, the government 
procurement cost tends to have a decreasing nature in the number of projects. Looking at the 
upfront investment willingness, there has been only limited support for an increasing trend for 
players who dispose of a competitive advantage at the start of the pipeline. In all other cases, the 
investment percentages tend to decrease. Therefore, an investment reimbursement might still be 
necessary to trigger the consortia’s enthusiasm to perform more upfront research. This levels the 
competition and reduces the risk of a contractor’s default, which would always come at the 
government’s expense due to the societal value of PPP projects. The extra cost of investment 
reimbursements might be partly offset by the reduced mark-ups that result from the pipeline. 
Nevertheless, in cases with considerable project-specific risks, it might be better to only 
prequalify two contractors to engage in the expensive tendering process. Contractors, public 
institutions and advisors that have provided comments on these results all believe in the 
importance of a project pipeline to increase competition and to attract new or overseas consortia 
that are willing to invest more money and resources to enter a market with a long-term 
perspective. 
Methodology-wise, this study has some limitations that require further consideration. Firstly, 
the findings are theoretical, are based on stringent assumptions and essentially need to be 
validated in a practical environment. As a PPP setting is highly competitive, bidding data are 
scarce to fully validate the model. Furthermore, a relaxation of the assumptions that pre-tender 
investment does not contribute to future knowledge and that contractors have unlimited capacity 
offers an opportunity for further research. Thirdly, for some scenarios, the heuristic did not 
converge in all states of the game. As earlier stages of the pipeline rely on the optimal bidding 
behavior of later stages, this limits the study of the entire scenario. Subsequently, the flexibility 
of the model trades off against the manageability of the analytical calculations, so that closed-
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form expressions or convergence proofs are not possible. Nevertheless, this shortcoming together 
with the highly relevant and state-of-the-art bidding framework, leaves opportunities for research 
in related fields like mathematical auction theory and algorithmic game theory. Nonetheless, the 
flexibility of the model does make it easy to test new governmental policies and the impact on 
the bidding behavior. Last but not least, the magnitude and the financial burden of PPP projects 
often inhibit to bid on more than one or two projects. Further research could focus on the 
interdependency of capacity constraints and the resulting equilibria.  
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Table 1 Illustration of the electromagnetism heuristic  
Table 2 Parameter values for the computer experiment 
Table 3 Average comparisons and associated p-values of the first stage of a two- or three-stage 
environment with respect to a single-stage environment 
Table 4 Actions for the first project in a pipeline with 𝑍 stages for player with initial experience level 𝑒1 
and competition given by (𝑒2, 𝑒3). Only the scenarios that involve players with 𝑒𝑝 ≤ 2 are reported. 
Table 5 Actions for the first project in a pipeline with 𝑍 stages for player with initial experience level 𝑒1 
and competition given by 𝑒2. Only the scenarios that involve players with 𝑒𝑝 ≤ 2 are reported. 
Table 6 Scenario-by-scenario comparison of the average strategic behavior in the case of a three-project 
pipeline and the case with three times tendering a single project 
Table 7 Aggregate results of the impact of government reimbursement on the equilibrium outcome of a 
three-project pipeline 
a
 Number of subgames in which at least one player does not participate. The total number of subgames is 
21 for the two-player setting and 56 for the three-player setting 
b
 Number of subgames in which all players have investment levels greater than 0% 
c
 Average cost of tendering three times a single project consecutively 
d
 An inexperienced player does not invest for the first project if he is playing against 𝑒2= 4 or 5 and 𝑍 = 3 
e
 Player with experience level 0 in subgames (0,4,4), (0,4,5) and (0,5,5) does not participate when 
𝑑=40%. Moving to 60% and 80% also adds (0,3,5) and (0,3,4), respectively, to the set of no-participation 
subgames. 
 
Table A1.1 Algorithm parameters used in the experiment 
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Table A2.1 ANOVA output for the actions in the first project of a 𝑍-project pipeline for a player with 
experience 𝑒1 and the opponents’ experience vector (𝑒2, 𝑒3) as a factor variable 
 
Table A2.2 ANOVA output for the actions in the first project of a 𝑍-project pipeline for a player with 
experience 𝑒1 and the opponent’s experience level 𝑒2 as a factor variable 
Fig. 1 Example of the sequential strategy for two players and three projects with 𝑒𝑢 = 5 and the 
parameters according to Sc. 1 
Fig. 2 Example of the response function 𝜋1
1(𝑎1|𝜃
1 = (1,1,2,0), 𝑎−1 = (1%, 20%, 1%, 20%)) 
Appendix 1: Equilibrium derivation algorithm 
Algorithm 1: MainAlgorithm() 
1: Generate 𝑅 random action profiles 𝑎𝑟 ∈ 𝒜 for 𝑟 ∈ {1,2, … , 𝑅} 
2: for 𝑟 = 1 to 𝑅 do 
3:  BestResponseAlgoritm(𝑎𝑟)  
4: end for 
5: EvaluateEquilibria() 
 
Algorithm 2: BestResponseAlgorithm(𝑎) 
𝐵𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑅𝐸𝑃= maximum number of loops 
𝐵𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑅𝐸𝑃= minimum number of loops 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣=convergence threshold 
1: 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 ← 0 
2: for 𝑘1 = 1 to 𝐵𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑅𝐸𝑃 do 
3:  𝑜 ← 𝑎  
4:  for 𝑝 = 1 to 𝑃 do 
5:   𝑎−𝑝 ← 𝑎 \{𝑎𝑝 } 
6:   SelectBestResponse(𝑝, 𝑎−𝑝) 
7:   𝑎𝑝 ← 𝑥
best 
8:  end for 
9:  If ‖𝑜 − 𝑎‖² < 0.00001 do 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 ←  𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 +  1 
10:  If (𝑘1 > 𝐵𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑅𝐸𝑃 & 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 > 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣): break 
11: end for 
 
 
Algorithm 3: SelectBestResponse(𝑝, 𝑎−𝑝) 
𝐸𝑀𝑅𝐸𝑃: number of electromagnetic iterations 
𝐿𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑃: number of local search iterations 
𝛼 = (𝛼1, 𝛼2): step length for local search procedure 
1: Generate 𝑇 random actions 𝑥𝑡 ∈ 𝒜𝑝 for 𝑡 ∈ {1,2, … , 𝑇} and calculate 𝑓𝑝(𝑥
𝑡) ← 𝜋𝑝(𝑥
𝑡|𝜃𝑧, 𝑎−𝑝) 
2: For 𝑘2 = 1 to 𝐸𝑀𝑅𝐸𝑃 do 
3:  𝑥best ← argmax{𝑓𝑝(𝑥
𝑡), ∀𝑥𝑡 ∈ 𝒯} 
4:  For all 𝑥𝑡 ∈ 𝒯 do 
5:   Calculate charges 𝑞𝑡 
6:   𝐹𝑡 ← 0  
7:  End for 
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8:  For all 𝑥𝑡 ∈ 𝒯\{𝑥best} do 
9:   For all 𝑥𝑢 ∈ 𝒯 do 
10:    If 𝑓𝑝(𝑥
𝑡) < 𝑓(𝑥𝑢) do 𝐹𝑡 ← 𝐹𝑡 + (𝑥𝑢 − 𝑥𝑡)𝑞𝑡𝑞𝑢/‖𝑥𝑢 − 𝑥𝑡‖² 
11:    Else 𝐹𝑡 ← 𝐹𝑡 − (𝑥𝑢 − 𝑥𝑡)𝑞𝑡𝑞𝑢/‖𝑥𝑢 − 𝑥𝑡‖² 
12:   End for 
13:  End for 
14:  For all 𝑥𝑡 ∈ 𝒯\{𝑥best} do 
15:   𝜂 ← 𝑈(0,1) 
16:   𝐹𝑡 ← 𝐹𝑡/‖𝐹𝑡‖ 
17:   For 𝑛 = 1 to 2 do 
18:    If 𝐹𝑛
𝑡 > 0 do 𝑥𝑛
𝑡 ← 𝑥𝑛
𝑡 + 𝜂𝐹𝑛
𝑡(𝑢𝑛 − 𝑥𝑛
𝑡 ) 
19:    Else 𝑥𝑛
𝑡 ← 𝑥𝑛
𝑡 − 𝜂𝐹𝑛
𝑡(𝑥𝑛
𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛) 
20:   End for 
21:  End for 
22: End for 
23: For all 𝑥𝑡 ∈ 𝒯 do 
24:  For 𝑘3 = 1 to 𝐿𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑃 do 
25:   𝑦 ← 𝑥𝑡 
26:   For 𝑛 = 1 to 2 do 
27:    𝜅 ← 𝑈(0,1) 
28:    𝑦𝑛 ← 𝑦𝑛 + 𝛼𝑛(𝜅 − 0.5) 
29:   End for 
30:   If 𝑓𝑝(𝑦) > 𝑓𝑝(𝑥
𝑡): 𝑥𝑡 ← 𝑦 
31:  End for 
32: End for 
33: 𝑥best ← argmax {𝑓𝑝(𝑥
𝑡), ∀𝑡}  
 
Algorithm 4: EvaluateEquilibria() 
𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇= maximum distance from existing cluster 
𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇= minimum support criterion to avoid local minimum 
1:  Vector with number of points per cluster 𝑤 = (𝑤1, … , 𝑤𝑅) ∈ ℤ𝑅 ← 0  
2: 𝑐1 ∈ 𝒞 ← 𝑎
1, 𝐶 ← 1, 𝑤1 ← 1  
3: For 𝑟 = 1 to 𝑅 do 
4:  𝑐closest ← argmin {‖𝑎𝑟 − 𝑐𝑖‖
2
, ∀𝑐𝑖 ∈ 𝒞} 
5:  If ‖𝑎𝑟 − 𝑐closest‖² < 𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇 do 
6:   𝑐𝑖 ← (𝑐𝑖𝑤𝑖 + 𝑎𝑟)/(𝑤𝑖 + 1) 
7:   𝑤𝑖 ← 𝑤𝑖 + 1 
8:  Else 𝑐2 ∈ 𝒞 ← 𝑎
𝑟, 𝐶 ← 𝐶 + 1, 𝑤𝐶 ← 1 
9:  End if 
10: End for 
11: For 𝑖 = 1 to 𝐶 do 
12:  If 𝑤𝑖 < 𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇 do 𝑤𝑖 ← 0 
13:  Else for 𝑗 = 1 to 𝐶 do 
14:   If 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 & 𝑤𝑗 ≥ 𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇 do 
15:    If (𝑓𝑝(𝑐𝑖) < 𝑓𝑝(𝑐
𝑗), ∀𝑝) do 𝑤𝑖 ← 0 
16:   End if 
17:  End for  
18:  End if 
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19: End for 
20: 𝑐best ←  argmax{∑ 𝑓𝑝(𝑐
𝑖), ∀𝑖𝑝  with 𝑤
𝑖 > 0}  
21: 𝑜 ← 𝑐best  
22: BestResponseAlgorithm(𝑐best) 
23: If ‖𝑜 − 𝑐best‖² > 𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇 print “Cluster is no equilibrium. Further investigation required.” 
 
 
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
𝑅  10 𝑇  5 
𝐵𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑅𝐸𝑃  10 𝐵𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑅𝐸𝑃  30 
𝐸𝑀𝑅𝐸𝑃  4 𝐿𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑃  30 
𝛼  (0.5, 2) 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣  5 
𝑀𝐴𝑋𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇  5 𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇  2 
Table A1.1 Algorithm parameters used in the experiment 
 
 
Appendix 2: ANOVA output  
 
Analysis of variance table – 3 players 
Response: 𝑖(𝑎1
∗𝑧|𝜃𝑧) 𝑚(𝑎1
∗𝑧|𝜃𝑧) 
Variable Df Mean Sq F-value p-value Sign Mean Sq F-value p-value Sign 
𝛾𝑖  1 167.965 5575.52 <2.2*10
-16 *** 13365.6 3255.1 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 
𝛾𝑒  1 0.002 0.0725 0.7877  2057.3 501.05 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 
𝑒1  1 81.291 2698.43 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 6482.0 1578.6 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 
(𝑒2, 𝑒3)  20 2.875 95.4308 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 53.7 13.083 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 
𝑍  1 0.093 3.0858 0.0791 * 429.7 104.64 <2.2*10-16 *** 
𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝛾𝑒  1 0.002 0.0649 0.7990  3.0 0.7243 0.3948  
𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝑒1  1 81.224 2696.20 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 301.7 73.473 <2.2*10
-16 *** 
𝛾𝑖 ∗ (𝑒2, 𝑒3)  20 2.871 95.3011 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 24.5 5.9789 1.3*10
-15 *** 
𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝑍  1 0.091 3.0308 0.0819 * 2.9 0.7145 0.3981  
𝛾𝑒 ∗ 𝑒1  1 0.108 3.5908 0.0583 * 1958.7 477.02 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 
𝛾𝑒 ∗ (𝑒2, 𝑒3)  20 0.034 1.1337 0.3065  6.7 1.6248 0.0395
 ** 
𝛾𝑒 ∗ 𝑍  1 0.000 0.0001 0.9920  15.5 3.7734 0.0522 * 
𝑒1 ∗ (𝑒2, 𝑒3)  20 0.518 17.2018 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 90.0 21.919 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 
𝑒1 ∗ 𝑍  1 0.015 0.4841 0.4867  131.0 31.915 1.9*10
-8 *** 
(𝑒2, 𝑒3) ∗ 𝑍  20 0.011 0.3739 0.9947  4.2 1.0164 0.4384 *** 
Residuals 1905 0.030    4.1    
Table A2.1 ANOVA output for the actions in the first project of a 𝑍-project pipeline for a player with 
experience 𝑒1 and the opponents’ experience vector (𝑒2, 𝑒3) as a factor variable 
 
 
Analysis of variance table – 2 players 
Response: 𝑖(𝑎1
∗𝑧|𝜃𝑧) 𝑚(𝑎1
∗𝑧|𝜃𝑧) 
Variable Df Mean Sq F-value p-value Sign Mean Sq F-value p-value Sign 
𝛾𝑖  1 267.216 11867.2 <2.2*10
-16 *** 1054.55 1510.9 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 
𝛾𝑒  1 1.151 51.1196 3.4*10
-12 *** 521.32 746.89 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 
𝑒1  1 18.544 823.561 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 58.99 84.519 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 
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𝑒2  5 1.475 65.5167 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 178.11 255.18 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 
𝑍  1 0.069 3.0677 0.0805 * 132.88 190.38 <2.2*10-16 *** 
𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝛾𝑒  1 0.449 19.9240 1.0*10
-5 *** 0.58 0.8291 0.3630  
𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝑒1  1 8.845 392.829 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 1.11 1.5936 0.2074
  
𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝑒2  5 0.179 7.9488 3.3*10
-7 *** 2.35 3.3718 0.0053
 *** 
𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝑍  1 0.194 8.6360 0.0035 *** 4.43 6.3520 0.0121 ** 
𝛾𝑒 ∗ 𝑒1  1 0.252 11.1748 0.0001 *** 173.38 248.41 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 
𝛾𝑒 ∗ 𝑒2  5 0.079 3.5118 0.0040 ** 32.84 47.046 <2.2*10
-16 *** 
𝛾𝑒 ∗ 𝑍  1 0.009 0.3921 0.5315  4.38 6.2805 0.0126 ** 
𝑒1 ∗ 𝑒2  5 0.027 1.2185 0.2992  26.29 37.666 <2.2*10
-16
 *** 
𝑒1 ∗ 𝑍  1 0.589 26.1733 4.6*10
-7 *** 25.34 36.305 3.4*10
-9 *** 
𝑒2 ∗ 𝑍  5 0.119 5.2837 9.8*10
-5 *** 14.00 20.052 <2.2*10
-16 *** 
Residuals 468 0.023    0.70    
Table A2.2 ANOVA output for the actions in the first project of a 𝑍-project pipeline for a player with 
experience 𝑒1 and the opponent’s experience level 𝑒2 as a factor variable 
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